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THE INCIDENCE OF MANDATED EMPLOYER-PROVIDED INSURANCE: LESSONS FROM WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE 7BSTRACT
Workers' compensation insurance provides cash payments and medical benefits to workers who incur a work-related injury or illness. Many features of the workers' compensation program parallel features of proposed mandated employer-paid health insurance plans. This paper empirically examines the incidence of the workers' compensation program to infer the likely consequences of mandated health insurance proposals. In certain industries, such as trucking and carpentry, workers' compensation insurance costs are quite large, and vary tremendously within states over time, and across states at a moment in time. This variation is used to identify the incidence of the program. Empirical analysis of two data sets suggest that changes in employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance are largely shifted to employees in the form of lower wages. In addition, higher insurance costs are found to have a negative but statistically insignificant effect on employment. The implied elasticity of labor demand from our results is about -.50.
There are two primary methods that a government can use to provide universal access to a good or service: it can provide the good or service directly, as in the case of public education and national parks, or it can mandate that employers arrange for provision of the good or service for their workers and dependents, as in the case of workers' compensation insurance and certain pension safeguards. These two approaches may have different implications for the efficiency and equity of a public program. 2These statistics are from Chollet (1987) .
insurance coverage to a large number of uninsured individuals without radically restructuring the insurance industry. Furthermore, mandating that employers provide health insurance for their workers is a way for the government to expand health insurance coverage without raising taxes. This feature of mandated benefits takes on added significance in an era of tight budget constraints.
Although the government may be able to shed responsibility for the cost of providing health insurance in a mandated program, there may nevertheless be substantial societal costs to such a program. In particular, requiring employers to pay health insurance premiums may increase the cost of hiring workers and result in lower employment.
Indeed, Dr. Lewis Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, recently based his opposition to mandated health benefits on the presumption that: "By adding overly burdensome mandates on business, we could retard economic growth and constrict employment opportunities."3 But will mandated health insurance dramatically reduce employment?
Traditional payroll tax incidence models suggest that some portion of the rise in employer costs may be shifted to wages, mitigating the fall in employment. And perhaps more importantly, if employees value health insurance, the theory of compensating wage differentials suggests that wages will fall even further than in the case of a pure payroll tax, further reducing the employment decline. In equilibrium, if the value employees place on health insurance is equivalent to the employers' costs of providing insurance, wages will be reduced by the full cost of the benefit and employment will be unchanged.
3Quoted from The New York Times, July 24, 1990, p. AlO.
Although economic models provide a clear framework for analyzing the impact of compulsory insurance, the available empirical evidence on the tradeoff between fringe benefits and wages provides little evidence of wage offsets. In fact, an impressive number of published papers report the "wrong" signed coefficient in analyses of the wage-fringe benefit relationship.4 More generally, the labor economics literature has been largely unsuccessful in documenting consistent evidence of compensating wage differentials for a variety of nonpecuniary factors, such as the risk of unemployment and workplace hazards.0 The findings of this literature challenge the view that the costs of mandated employer-provided health insurance will be shifted to employees in the form of lower pay.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why the empirical evidence may fail to find evidence of a tradeoff between fringe benefits and wages even if such a tradeoff exists. First, available data sets do not permit researchers to control for all aspects of worker productivity. This is a problem because more productive employees may prefer to take their compensation in the form of both higher wages and higher fringe benefits.
Second, most of the literature has examined fringe benefits that are voluntarily chosen by employers and employees. With voluntary fringes, it is difficult to identify exogenous variation in benefits that should induce wage offsets. Finally, the studies that have examined the effect on wages of mandated benefits (e.g. , unemployment insurance) are identified by relatively small differences in program costs across states and over time.
"A good example of this literature is Smith and Ehrenberg (1983) . Additional references are given in Section 2.
5See Brown (1980) and Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) for examples.
As a result, any tradeoff between fringes and wages could easily be swamped by greater variation in omitted, state-level factors, such as union power. This paper presents new evidence on the incidence of mandated employer-provided insurance by examining the experience of the workers' compensation insurance program. Workers' compensation laws require employers to secure insurance to provide a minimum level of cash payments and medical benefits in the event of work-related injuries and illnesses.
The laws are exclusively administered by the states, which leads to wide variation in the generosity of the program across the states a: a point in time, and within states over time. For example, the insurance rate in the trucking industry in 1987 rarged from 3 percent of payroll in Indiana to 25 percent of payroll in Montana. We use two data sets to estimate the effect of increases in workers' compensation costs on wages and employment.
Throughout much of the analysis we focus on five high-risk industries (truck drivers, carpenters, plumbers, gasoline station employees, and nonprofessional hospital employees) that have great cost variability.
The structure of the workers' compensation program enables us to overcome at least some of the limitations of the past literature. Firs:, workers' compensation benefits are not voluntary fringe benefits. Second, we test for insurance shifting in narrowly defined industries and occupations, so bias due to omitted worker and job characteristics poses less of a problem. Third, most of the analysis uses the wide variation in the growth of insurance rates in states over a ten year period to identify the extent of insurance rate shifting. We are aware of no other payroll "tax" that varies as much across states or over time as workers' compensation insurance rates.
Finally, we note that the workers' compensation insurance program has much in common with proposed mandated health insurance schemes. In both programs, employers are required to secure a minimum level of insurance for their workers, and employers directly pay the insurance premiums.
Furthermore, a substantial component (over 35 percent of costs) of the workers' compensation program is medical insurance for workplace injuries and illnesses. Consequently, inferences drawn from the workers' compensation program may be relevant for mandated health insurance.
I. Conceptual Framework and Institutional Analysis Summers (1989) argues that, because of wage offsets, the incidence and welfare costs of employer mandated benefits are different from that of a 6 pure payroll tax which is used to finance public provision of benefits.
The basic point of his argument is illustrated in Figure l . The imposition of an employer mandate will shift the labor demand curve downward (from DD to D'lD') and, with a fixed labor supply schedule, employment would fall from to and wages from to W1. However, if workers value the benefit which they are receiving, labor supply will shift outwards, and employment will fall by a lesser amount (to in Figure 1 ), whereas wages will fall by an even greater amount (to U2). Thus, wage offsets in response to mandated benefits have the potential to reduce the 6Danzon (1989) provides a related analysis, which also nodels the impact of heterogeneous workers and considers the general equilibrium implications.
7We have drawn the labor supply curve assuming the substitution effect dominates the income effect in the relevant range. labor cost increases created by mandated benefits.8
Formally, suppose that labor demand (Ld) is given by:
(1) Ld -
and further suppose that labor supply (L) is given by:
where C is the cost of mandated health insurance, oC is the monetary value that employees place on health insurance, and ¶J is the wage rate. Using this notation it can easily be shown that:
where 1d and are the elasticities of demand for and supply of labor, respectively. From equation (3) it is clear that if c equals one, wages would fall by the full cost of the mandated benefit. In this situation, the employer's cost of providing the mandated benefit would be fully shifted to employees. On the other hand, if employees place no value on mandated health insurance, which is the case if a -0, the incidence of mandated health insurance is exactly analogous to that of a payroll tax.
As explained below, we rely on inter-state differences in workers' compensation costs across industrial groups over a ten-year time period in our empirical work.
If, as seems likely, workers are mobile across states and/or industries over this time horizon, , will be quite large. In the 8As Summers notes, this analysis must be construed differently for health care benefits, which are fixed with respect to hours of (full.time) work, and for other types of benefits. This does not affect the analysis as long as one assumes that employment, rather than hours, are represented on the horizontal axis.
limit, as approaches infinity the proportion of costs that are shifted to wages tends to a.
The effect of mandating benefits on employment is:
--L which indicates that the amount of employment sacrificed because of mandated health insurance is inversely related to the wage offset caused 5'; the provision of health insurance. Thus, we can summarize the labor market effects of mandated benefits in terms of the elasticities of supply and demand for labor, the cost of the benefit, and the fraction of that cost that is valued by employees.
A. Previous Evidence
What is the evidence for the shifting of employer benefit costs? A large empirical literature addresses this question by estimating hedonic labor market relationships (see Rosen, 1987 for a survey). However, past efforts to find the expected negative coefficient on fringe benefits in wage equations have been largely unsuccessful, as is discussed by Triplet:
(1983), Smith and Ehrenberg (1983) , Leibowitz (1983) and Monheit, Hagan, Serk and Farley (1985) . Perhaps the failure to find a tradeoff between fringe benefits and wages should not be surprising in view of the difficulty establishing compensating wage differentials for a variety of other nonwage aspects of work, including the risk of layoff. In fact, with the notable exception of work fatalities, the labor economics literature has not found consistent evidence of compensating wage differentials for work disamenities (see Brown, 1981 and Smith, 1979) .
One of the difficulties in interpreting this literature, however. is that most studies of compensating differentials compare wages and working conditions among workers in different occupations and industries. There is nothing in the theory of compensating differentials to suggest that lawyers should receive less generous fringe benefits than manual laborers because of their higher wage. Indeed, if fringe benefits are a normal good, one would expect higher-paid workers to take some of their compensation in the form of better working conditions and fringe benefits. Nevertheless, the past literature on compensating differentials should challenge researchers to search for additional evidence before assuming that employee valuation of fringe benefits will be reflected in the incidence of those benefits.
Finally, we note that a related empirical literature has developed within public finance attempting to measure the incidence of payroll taxes.
Unlike research on compensating differentials, most of this research is based on time-series or cross-country data. In an early cross-country study, Brittain (1972) reports evidence which he interprets as showing payroll taxes are fully offset by lower wages.9 In an analysis of an unusual natural social experiment, Holmlund (1983) uses time-series data on payroll taxes in Sweden to examine wage growth in a period when the payroll tax increased from 14 percent to 40 percent. He estimates that roughly 50 percent of the employer payroll tax is shifted to wages in the short-run.
Finally, Hamermesh (1979) uses the variation in payroll tax rates due to the social security payroll tax limit to estimate wage offsets; his 9More specifically, Britain finds that capital's share does not decline with the imposition of a payroll tax. See Feldstein (1972) for a detailed critique of Brittain's work, in which he points out that Brittain's test can be viewed simply as evidence that the gross wage equals the marginal product of labor.
estimates indicate that from 0 to 35 percent of the social security tax is shifted to wagesJ°A lthough it would be desirable to have estimates of all of the parameters in equation (3) to forecast the incidence of mandated insurance benefits, in view of the past literature we have a more modest goal: We simply would like to examine the empirical plausibility of wage offsets in response to changes in the employers' cost of providing mandated benefits in the workers' compensation insurance program. If the evidence suggests that the employers' cost of providing workers' compensation insurance are offset by lower wages, then the expectation that mandated health insurance costs would be shifted to wages will be strengthened.
B. Description of Health Insurance Proposals
The potential importance of cost shifting of mandated health benefits is highlighted in Table 1 , which summarizes several recent Federal and state proposals to compel employers to provide health care benefits. The Federal proposal (The Basic Health Benefits for All .Americans Act) would mandate that all full-time workers have health insurance, with firms paying at least 80 percent of the premiums.11 Similarly, the state proposals include some employer costs, either through a strict provision mandate, through a payroll tax, or through a "pay-or-play" plan. in which firms that do not provide a certain minimum level of health care must pay the 10Hamermesh's range of tax rates is from 0 to 5.85 percent. By contrast, the range in workers' compensation insurance rates across states in the industries we examine is from 3 to 26 percent of payroll.
bill passed the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, and is currently being discussed, along with alternative proposals, by a bipartisan Senate working group. difference in the form of a payroll tax. For example, in Massachusetts, any firm that does not spend an average of 12 percent of the Medical Security Wage Base on employee health benefits must pay the difference it-ito a fund from which the state will purchase insurance for the uninsured.12 Table 1 indicates that employers will nominally bear the cost of providing health insurance for their employees according to the proposed legislation in each state. In addition, many of the proposed laws would use tax revenue generated by employer mandates to fund a larger universal insurance system, which would extend coverage to uninsured individuals who do not work. If the insurance provided Co nonemployed individuals is commensurate with that provided through employment, the labor supply curve depicted in Figure 1 would not shift. More generally, the extent the labor supply curve shifts is inversely related to the quality of health insurance provided to nonworkers.13
The ultimate incidence of mandated employer-provided health insurance plans is difficult to predict because of the modest experience with such plans in the U.S. However, the structure of workers' compensation insurance, which in many respects is similar to proposed health insurance plans, provides an opportunity to estimate the actual incidence of mandated employer-provided insurance.
base is currently $14,000, and is indexed for medical inflation.
13Notice also that as the quality of health insurance provided to nonworkers improves, the relative efficiency gains of mandated benefits vis-a-vis public provision, which Sujnnters (1989) emphasizes, declines.
II. Workers' Compensation Insurance
Workers' compensation insurance is the oldest and largest mandated employer benefit program in the United States. In 1987 (the latest year with available data) workers' compensation benefits totalled $27.4 billion, and employer insurance costs equalled $38 billion.14 The structure of the program allows for a test of the incidence of mandated benefits. Employers are required to purchase insurance or self-insure to provide a minimum level of cash benefits and medical care for workers who suffer a workrelated injury or illness. Employees are covered by workers' compensation immediately upon being hired.
The level of benefits that employers are required to provide varies tremendously across states, and has increased substantially in many states since the mid-1970sJ5 Table 2 documents the variability in workers' compensation benefits for a sample of 10 states. In Indiana, for example, an employee whose arm is permanently disabled in a work-related accident is entitled to a maximum indemnity benefit of $27,450. The same injury in Illinois qualifies for a maximum benefit that is more than five times as generous ($142,112) . Similarly, benefits for the other types of injuries exhibit tremendous variability across states.
In addition, although it is difficult to quantify, it is widely believed that some states are more restrictive than others in permitting certain kinds of claims. This is especially likely to be the case for back injuries, which are difficult to diagnose objectively, and costly to 14These statistics are fron Nelson (1987) , Tables 1 and 7. 15In large part, several states increased their workers' compensation benefits in the l970s to conform with the recommendations of the National Commission on Workmen's Compensation Laws.
treat.16 Finally, Some states require more generous medical benefits than others. For example, states vary in the extent of choice they allow employees over their treating physician.17
In most states workers' compensation insurance rates are established by a rating bureau. In principle, these rates are based on the actuarial cost of workers' compensation insurance, which is the expected benefit paid to each injury times the probability that a worker will incur each type of injury. A different rate is established for several hundred detailed industrial/occupational groups, known as activities. In 36 states, a national rate-making organization known as the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) pools information on risks and proposes rates for each activity. Several other states follow procedures that are similar to the NCCI. The rates adopted by the states are known as "manual" rates.
Manual rates are the initial rate posted to firms, but they are not the actual, bottom line cost of insurance in many cases. For many employers manual rates are adjusted in response to the specific firm's loss experience (e.g., experience rating), dividends are paid by insurance companies, and large firms may be retrospectively rated.18 ?ecause manual rates and the bottom line insurance costs are highly correlated, manual 16Je also note that there is variability across states in the waiting period required before benefit payments commence, and in the retroactive period upon which benefits are paid retroactively to compensate for the waiting period.
17See Boden and Fleishman (1990) for an analysis of interstate differences in medical costs in workers' compensation insurance.
18The rate making process is described in detail in Burton, Hunt, and Krueger (1985) . Although on net experience rating hardly changes the average cost of workers' compensation insurance in a state, the other rating devices tend to reduce employers' costs, on average.
rates provide a reasonable approximation of the actuarial cost of benefits for each activity.19 Furthermore, unlike in unemployment insurance, there is no cross-industry subsidization in workers' compensation rates. The table focuses on five activities that are the focus of our empirical analysis on premium shifting (carpenters, gasoline station workers, nonprofessional hospital employees, plumbers, and truck drivers).21 These activities were selected because they comprise a large sample of workers in most states, and because they concord well with the occupational and industry definitions used by the Census Bureau. Furthermore, we selected these activities because work-injury rates are high in these jobs. For example, Table 3 shows that one in twenty truck drivers receives workers' compensation in a year, as opposed to less than one in fifty workers in all jobs. Because work injuries are a prominent feature of employment in these jobs, it is more likely that workers will be aware of their benefits under workers' compensation insurance and that the cost of providing these benefits will be shifted onto wages. 19For example, the correlation between the average manual rate in a state and the average manual rates adjusted to reflect dividends, experience rating. premium discounts, rate deviations is 0.85. (Source: authors' estimates based on Table 4 and Table 22 of Burton, Hunt and Krueger, 1985) . 20The insurance rates are described in more detail in the Data Appendix.
21The rates for carpenters are a weighted average of two carpentry classes (NCCI class 5403 and 5645), where the weights are the payroll attributed to each class nationally.
The spread in insurance rates for truck drivers across the states is enormous. For example, in 1987 the rate for truck drivers in Minnesota was 21 percent of payroll, while the rate for the same category of workers in Indiana was only 3 percent of payroll.22 Furthermore, there is great diversity among the states in the growth in these insurance rates over the last ten years. For example, rates soared from 9.7 to 20.3 percent of payroll in Hawaii between 1978 and 1987, while they fell by nearly 4 points in New York over the same time period. An important source of variation for within-state changes in workers' compensation costs over time is changes in benefit generosity (see Burton, 1990 and Butler and Worrall, 1990) .
We are aware of only one study that uses inter-state variation in workers' compensation costs to estimate the extent of shifting of mandated benefits.23 Dorsey and Walzer (1983) 
use the May 1978 Current Population
Survey to estimate the tradeoff between employer liability for injuries as measured by workers' compensation costs and earnings. They find a large, negative effect of workers' compensation costs on wages in the nonunion sector, and a large, positive effect of workers' compensation costs in the union sector. Our analysis has several different features than Dorsey and Walzer's. Most importantly, we estimate the extent of cost shifting for narrowly defined activities that have wide inter-state variability in 22lnsurance rates for truck drivers are especially high because they have a high injury rate, and because their injuries tend to be relatively costly. Interestingly, data for Minnesota indicate that only 14 percent of truck drivers' injuries are from highway accidents, while almost half are from falls or strains and sprains (see Lewis, Meyers and Senese, 1988) . 23Moore and Viscusi (1989; Chapter 2) review several studies that estimate the relationship between wages and workers' compensation benefit levels. Most of these studies find a negative relationship.
costs, and we incorporate permanent state effects in the analysis. In addition, we provide estimates of the effect of workers' compensation insurance costs on employment.
III. Estimates of the Incidence of Workers' Conensatiort Insurance
We base our initial analysis of insurance cost shifting on micro-data Data on workers' compensation rates for most states were provided to us by John F. Burton, Jr. from his ongoing research on measuring workers' compensation costs. Tracking down rates for all the intervening years would be a difficult task, and we suspect that using rates for 1978 and 1987 does not greatly affect the results. . is the natural log of the usual hourly wage rate, C is the appropriate workers' compensation rate, X., is a vector of covariates, a represents a set of year dummy variables (t-1980,1981,1987,1988) , p. indicate that increases in workers' compensation costs are fully offset by lower wages, while a coefficient of 0 would imply no wage offsets.
Workers' compensation benefits are not subject to federal income tax.
Therefore, one might expect that the appropriate specification of equation (5) would utilize the after-tax wage as the dependent variable. However, if the tax rate for individuals in these activities is proportional to wages, then because the dependent variable is specified in log form the tax rate will be absorbed by the intercept term. Furthermore, the assunqLon of proportional taxes is likely to be approximately correct in this sample because most workers in these activities are below the earnings ceiling for the OASDHI payroll tax, and because workers in these activities are likely to be in a common tax bracket for the federal income tax.
Estimates of equation (5) are reported for each activity in the first five columns of Table 5 .
In four of the five activities we find a negative relationship between workers' compensation insurance rates and wages, but the relationship is statistically significant only for truck drivers.
Also, the wage-costs tradeoff is largest for truck drivers, with an estimated coefficient of -,97 (t-ratio --2.9). The other results suggest that approximately half of workers' compensation costs are shifted to wages for carpenters and gasoline station workers, but these estimates are fairly imprecise. On the other hand, the estimated tradeoff between wages and insurance costs for plumbers is positive (1.73), but the coefficient has a large standard error.
The other variables in the wage equations generally have their expected signs. In all of these activities more education is associated with higher earnings; there is a quadratic relationship between earnings and potential experience; part-time workers earn less per hour than full time workers; and apprentices earn less than fully trained workers. In addition, the equations include but do not report year dummy variables.
The estimated coefficients for the year dummies indicate that real wages fell by roughly 20 percent in these activities between 1979 and 1988, Columns (6) and (7) contain estimates for the pooled sample of the five activities. These equations also include four activity dummy variables. In column (6) we include 44 state dummy variables. In column (7) we interact the state dummy variables with the activity dummy variables. The estimated tradeoff between insurance costs and wages depends critically on the specification of the state effects. If each activity is constrained to have the same state effect (Column 6) , about 20 percent of workers' compensation costs are estimated to be offset by lower wages. However, if the activity effect is freed-up by state (Column 7), fully 86.5 percent of workers' compensation costs are shifted to employees.
Furthermore, an F-test indicates that state-by-activity effects explain a significant fraction of wage variability over the constrained state effects.
Evidently, the fixed state wage effects are also related to the level of workers' compensation costs. This relationship would occur, for example, if in some states unions have traditionally been influential in raising wages in some industry/occupation groups but not in others, and if influential unions are able to lobby for relatively more generous benefits for the types of injuries experienced by their members (e.g., back sprains vs. carpal tunnel syndrome). In this scenario, the less-restrictive model in Column (7) would provide a more appropriate estimate of the tradeoff between wages and the employers' cost of workers' compensation insurance.
A.
The Importance of State Effects.
The discussion above emphasizes the importance of the specification of the state effects in the pooled sample. It should further be noted that if the wage equations in Table 5 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) compiles state-level averages of car accident rate has a positive and statistically significant effect, but its inclusion only slightly reduces the positive wage-cost relationship.
Because the vast majority of truck drivers' injuries are unrelated to driving accidents, the car accident rate may be a poor measure of injury risk for these workers.
27The ES-202 data and the publicly available state-level data are described in BLS (1988) . We are grateful to Michael Buso of the BLS for creating an extract of these data for us. employment and wages by four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) from the ES-202 reports. Thus, we can use the BLS data to examine both wage and employment effects of workers' compensation insurance.
In comparison to the CPS, the BLS data have the advantage of being based on a virtual census of employers in the state. A disadvantage of the BLS data, however, is that the NCCI activity definitions do not match as well with the BLS data as they do with the CPS data because the SLS data are classified by industry alone. Therefore, to some extent the BLS data blur the occupational distinctions in the NCCI activity classifications. We matched the state-level data for 1979 and 1988 to workers' compensation rates in the preceding year for four of the five activities in the sample. Unfortunately, it was necessary to exclude non-professional hospital employees because the SIC classification system does not distinguish between professional and nonprofessional employees. However, another six high-cost industries that can be matched between the NCCI and SIC classifications were added to the sample. The additional industries are: agricultural machinery, excavation, gas and oil dealerships, lumber yards, masonry, and road and Street construction.28 in log wage on change in costs. A strong negative relationship is 28These activities were excluded from the micro analysis either because they do not match well with the three-digit census classifications and/or because the CPS sample sizes are too small to give precise estimates.
apparent. The slope of the regression line is -1, which is very close to the estimated extent of shifting in the trucking industry based on CPS data. Furthermore, most of the states (especially the large ones) tend to cluster fairly close around the regression line. Table 6 reports estimates of regressions of the ten-year change (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) in the log of the average wage on the change in insurance rates for the pooled sample of activities. In levels, this specification is analogous to the within-state-by-activity specification shown in Column 7 -of Table 5 , only we do not have controls for individual characteristics in the state-level analysis. We estimate a similar equation with the change in log employment as the dependent variable. In the first two columns we limit the sample to the original sample of activities (excluding nonprofessional hospital workers), and in the last two columns we use the expanded set of ten activities. The regressions are weighted by the number of reporting establishments in 1988.
For the original sample, the wage regression yields virtually the same coefficient on the workers' compensation cost variable as was found in the CPS micro data (compare column 7 of Table S with column I of Table 6 ). The results indicate that 86 percent of increases in workers' compensation costs are shifted to workers. The results for the expanded set of activities indicate a smaller tradeoff between wages and insurance costs (-.56) , but the estimate is still statistically significant and sizable.
The similarity between the aggregate results based on ELS data and the micro-level wage regressions based on CF'S data is reassuring, especially in light of their different unit of observation and industry definitions.
Columns 2 and 4 report results of regressing the change in log employment on the change in insurance rates. Because insurance costs appear to be only partially offset by lower wages, one would expect a negative coefficient on insurance rates in these regressions. The results provide some evidence of a negative effect of higher workers' compensation rates on employment growth, but the estimated coefficient is less than half its standard error in each sample.29 If one assumes that 85 percent of workers' compensation costs are shifted to wages and that the remaining 15 percent are borne by employers, then the coefficient estimate in Column 2 suggests that the elasticity of labor demand is -.75. On the other hand, if we assume that employers bear 44 percent of workers' compensation costs (1-.56), then the estimate in Column 4 implies an elasticity of labor demand of -.56. Although these estimates are extremely imprecise, they are within the range of typical estimates of the elasticity of labor demand in (see Card, 1990 and Clark and Freeman, 1981) . 
III. Application Health tnsurance
What can we infer about the likely consequences of mandatory employer-.
provided health insurance from the estimated incidence of the workers' compensation insurance program? Because employers who already provide health insurance are unlikely to be affected by a mandate to provide hea.a insurance, it is useful to consider the sectors of the workforce that have a low rate of coverage by health insurance. Table 7 reports the percent of various subgroups of the population that was covered by some form of health insurance in 1988. The relatively low rates of coverage for workers in the construction and agricultural industries, in small firms, and in lowwage jobs have been documented previously (e.g., Chollet, 1987) .
The low rate of health insurance coverage in low-wage jobs is potentially important for our purposes because the floor established by the minimum wage may impede wage offsets that would otherwise result from mandating health insurance. The jobs we have examined in the workers' compensation program typically have wage rates well above the minimum wage.
If an uninsured worker's wage is at or slightly above the minimum wage, the minimum wage may prevent wage offsets from occurring in response to benefit mandates. The existence of this kind of an institutional impediment would cause a greater employment reduction than suggested from our analysis of 30.ccording to Nelson (1990) , in 1987 approximately 88.4 million workers were covered by workers' compensation insurance.
workers' compensation insurance.31 Several authors have noted that the minimum wage may inhibit wage offsets in response to mandated health insurance (see Reinhardt, 1987 , Monheit, Hagan, Berk and Farley, 1985 and Chollet, 1987 . An important question is: How large is the share of uninsured workers that is potentially constrained by the minimum wage?
In an influential study based on the 1986 March CPS, Chollet (1987) claims that as many as 50 percent of uninsured workers earn less than 125 percent of the minimum wage, and that 35 percent of uninsured workers earn the minimum wage or less. Although we will present evidence suggesting these figures exaggerate the impact of the minimum wage, if a great many of the uninsured earn the minimum wage it is hard to imagine that important wage offsets would occur in response to mandated benefits.
To explore the impact of the minimum wage on health insurance shifting, we use the March 1989 CPS to estimate the earnings distribution of uninsured workers. Je restrict the sample to non-self employed individuals between age 16 and 65 who worked for pay in 1988. For each worker in the sample, an average hourly wage rate is calculated by dividing annual earnings by the product of annual weeks worked and usual weekly hours. To trim outliers, we exclude observations on individuals whose derived hourly earnings are below $1 per hour, or greater than $100 per hour.32 This sample is used to calculate the share of uninsured workers that is likely to be affected by the minimum wage. 3e note, of course, that insurance costs could be shifted by means of non-wage elements of the compensation package for minimum wage workers. Holzer, Katz, and analysis of application rates suggest incomplete rent dissipation in minimum wage jobs, however. the minimum wage or less. The estimate is 16.8 percent when we limit the sample to full-time, full-year workers, which is the group most likely to be covered by a mandated health insurance law.
For several reasons, we prefer estimates that place a window around the minimum wage, rather than the open-interval estimates in Column 1.
First, the annual average hourly wage rate is likely to be measured with considerable noise because it is based on self-reported annual hours of work, which is notoriously poorly measured (See Duncan and Hill, 1985) .
Second, some workers who earn more than the minimum wage may be constrained by the minimum wage because their earnings are prevented from falling below the wage floor in response to mandated health insurance. Finally, we wish to put a lower bound below the minimum wage because there is a tremendous amount of noncompliance with the minimum wage.34 If some individuals are paid less than the minimum --either legally or illegally --there is no reason to suspect that their wages will not be reduced if their employers 33The various sources of health insurance coverage are Medicare, Medicaid, CHANPU'S/VA care, employment-based insurance, and private health insurance. Coverage may be in one's own name or as a dependent.
34The extent of noncompliance with minimum wage was first documented by Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) . are required to provide them with health insurance.
Column (2) places a 35 Cent window around the minimum wage, and Column (3) places a 60 Cent window around the minimum wage. Since the estimated hourly Cost of meeting the Federal health insurance mandate is 55 cents for a full-time, full-year worker (see U.S. Congress (1989) ), the wider interval in Column (3) is probably a slight overstatement of the percent of uninsured workers who are constrained by the minimum wage. No matter how the wage intervals are defined, however, the results in Table 8 are quite different from Chollect's estimate that 50 percent of uninsured workers will be constrained by the minimum wage. According to our estimates, less than 20 percent of uninsured workers earn within 60 cents of the minimum wage. Although this is a nontrivial share of the uninsured, it suggests that for the majority of uninsured workers there is scope for wage offsets engendered by mandated employer-provided health insurance.
Why are our estimates considerably lower than Chollett's, even though both are based on March CPS data? The discrepancy is mainly due to the fact that we exclude self-employed workers. For example, including the self-employed raises the estimate of the number of uninsured workers below the minimum wage by nearly 10 percentage points. However, we believe that three reasons justify excluding the self-employed from these tabulations.
First, the proposals outlined in Table 1 do not apply to self-employed workers. Second, self-employed workers are typically exempted from State and Federal minimum wage laws. Third, the earnings of the self-employed reflect returns and losses to capital investments.
Finally, we note that Table 8 On the other hand, the real minimum wage has increased since March 1989, and thus may be more of a constraint. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the minimum wage may not be as much of an impediment to wage adjustments in response to mandated benefits as previously believed.
IV.

Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the impact of cost shifting in response to increases in mandated workers' compensation insurance costs. The results suggest that a substantial portion of the cost to employers of providing workers' compensation benefits are shifted to employees in the form of lower wages. Given the similarity between workers' compensation insurance and many proposed employer-mandated health insurance plans, our findings suggest that a large share of the employers' cost of meeting health insurance mandates may be borne by employees. Furthermore, our tabulations of the share of uninsured workers whose earnings are near the minimum wage suggest that in 1988 less than one-fifth of uninsured workers were likely to be constrained by the minimum wage. Although the nominal burden of mandated employment-based health insurance will be borne by firms, if the experience of health insurance is similar to that of workers' compensation insurance, our estimates suggest that employees will ultimately bear a large fraction of the burden of financing mandated health insurance through lower wages.
In spite of our main conclusion that at sizable portion of the cost of mandated benefits are likely to be shifted to employees, we should also stress that the shifting of workers' compensation costs is incomplete.
Employers bear at least some additional cost because of mandated workinjury insurance. As a consequence, we find that increases in workers' compensation costs are associated with reduced employment growth. Althou;h extremely imprecise, our estimates suggest that every one percentage point increase in workers' compensation rates is associated with an employment decline of .11 percent. The adverse employment effects of mandated health insurance may well be larger than those in workers' compensation insurance because the minimum wage is likely to be more of a constraint for uninsured workers, especially in light of recent increases in the real minimum. 
CPS Data.
The CPS data used in Table 5 are from the outgoing rotation group files for 1979, 1980, 1981, 1987 and 1988 (1) and (3) of Table 6 is the change in the log of the arithmetic average annual wage in each industry. The annual wage is in 1988 dollars. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is the change in log employment. The SIC codes for the four activities in the basic sample in Table 6 
